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ABSTRACT
Device Analyzer is an Android app available from the Google
Play store. It is designed to collect a large range of data
from the handset and, with agreement from our contribu-
tors, share it with researchers around the world. Researchers
can access the data collected, and can also use the platform
to support their own user studies. In this paper we provide
an overview of the privacy-enhancing techniques used in De-
vice Analzyer, including transparency, consent, purpose, ac-
cess, withdrawal, and accountability. We also demonstrate
the utility of our platform by assessing the security of the
Android ecosystem to privilege escalation attacks and deter-
mine that 88% of Android devices are, on average, vulnera-
ble to one or more of these type of attacks.
1. INTRODUCTION
Device Analyzer [1] is an Android app available from the
Google Play store. It is designed to collect a large range of
data from the handset and, with agreement from our con-
tributors, share it with researchers around the world. Our
app collects data on: apps installed, when they are run and
the resources they consume; data transferred and the air in-
terfaces used; phone calls placed and received as well as text
messages sent and received; battery levels, charging cycles
and power usage; Bluetooth devices and WiFi access points
seen and connected to; handset location; as well as other
system parameters [2].
Our contributors install the app from the Google Play
store and in return we provide them with summary statis-
tics in the app, and a copy of their data from the project
web page. We have received contributions from over 23,000
devices around the world since May 2011 and our archive
now contains over 100 billion records.
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2. PRIVACY-AWARE DATA SHARING
We encourage third-party researchers to use Device Ana-
lyzer in two ways: (i) researchers can sign a legal agreement
with the University of Cambridge to access data from con-
tributors who consent to data sharing; and (ii) contributors
can enter a participation code to take part in a study run
by external researchers. The difference between the two is
the amount of data available: in the former case sensitive
data items are not made available; in the latter case they
are. The Device Analyzer website [3] contains instructions
on how to access the data. External researchers should go
through their own ethics review and in all cases contributors
install our app from the Google Play store.
Our approach is based on both the European legal frame-
work, and the seven principles of Privacy by Design [4]. Our
approach is compatible with an earlier set of recommenda-
tions made to researchers in ubiquitous computing [5]. An
overview of our approach follows.
Transparency, consent, and purpose: Our data col-
lection is both transparent and explicitly given by the con-
tributor. Device Analyzer is distributed as a standalone app
on the Google Play store; it is never bundled with other soft-
ware or pre-installed on devices. We require consent inside
the app to activate data collection and remind the contrib-
utor of on-going data collection via a monthly notification.
These notifications also raise awareness of the app if it is
installed by someone else without the owner’s consent (e.g.
a stalker installing the app on a victim’s phone). Data col-
lection can be suspended at any time inside the app.
Security: Communication is secured with TLS and data
stored on local servers in the Computer Laboratory.
Access and withdrawal: Contributors can view sum-
mary data on their smartphone. Space constraints prohibit
accessing the full archive on the device itself, but contribu-
tors can download their data from the project website. Con-
tributors can delete their data and withdraw from the study
at any time from within the app. We do not provide external
researchers with access to any data until it is at least three
months old. This is a “try before you buy” approach with
the added advantage that older data is less invasive in many
cases. We do see active use of withdrawal and opt-out fea-
tures. Between May 2011 and December 2013 approximately
40% of our 26,800 installations were never activated, 4% of
contributors withdrew from further collection and 2.5% re-
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Figure 1: Proportion of devices running insecure, maybe secure and secure versions of Android against time.
Large increases in insecure devices occur when new vulnerabilities are discovered, with those which have the
biggest impact (zergRush, APK duplicate file, vold asec) annotated.
quested all of their historic data be deleted.
Accountability: We provide a quick feedback feature
inside the app to collect anonymous feedback and a working
email address in the app and on the project website.
Proactive privacy: Device Analyzer collects metadata
rather than direct personal identifiers. To do so, we apply a
salted hash to direct personal identifiers on the device itself
before they leave the handset. For example, we do not collect
an audio recording of a phone call; we record time, duration
and a salted hash of the phone number called. This means
that we do not know the number called, but we can tell when
a contributor calls the same number twice. This also means
we cannot trivially construct a social network between our
contributors.
Privacy by default: Contributors must explicitly opt-in
to reveal some data items. For example, by default, GSM
cell tower identifiers and Wifi AP names are preprocessed by
a salted hash function on the device. By default, location
data is only available to researchers in Cambridge.
3. EXAMPLE: ANDROID SECURITY
We have used Device Analyzer to answer many research
questions. Here is one: Can my phone prevent a mali-
cious app from gaining root on my device? Device Ana-
lyzer collects OS version strings and build numbers, and we
have compared these with 11 publicly disclosed privilege-
escalation attacks drawn from our database on AndroidVul-
nerabilities.org. We have looked at data over 3 years and
20,100 devices and found that, on average, 88% of devices
were exposed to known privilege-escalation attacks.
Figure 1 provides a more detailed view. A device is marked
as insecure if both: (1) it is running a version of Android
which is vulnerable to at least one privilege escalation at-
tack; and (2) the device has not received an update which
might fix the vulnerability; a device is marked maybe secure
if it has received an update which might fix the vulnera-
bility; and a device is secure if it is running a version of
Android which is not vulnerable to any publicly disclosed
vulnerabilities on the date in question.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced Device Analyzer and de-
scribed how external researchers can use the platform to an-
swer research questions and conduct new user studies. We
have provided an overview of the privacy-enhancing tech-
niques we have integrated into Device Analyzer in order to
protect the privacy of our contributors and provide an exam-
ple usage of the data, showing that 88% of Android devices
are, on average, vulnerable to one or more privilege escala-
tion attacks.
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